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Münsterberg and other observers. His object is to present a general view of what has been done already in this department of research. The study of the time-relations of mental phenomena is of importance in various connections. As Professor Jastrow remarks :

"It serves as an index of mental complexity, giving the sanction of objective demonstration to the results of subjective observation ; it indicates a mode of analysis of the simpler mental acts, as well as the relation of these laboratory products to the processes of daily life ; it demonstrates the close interrelation of psychological with physiological facts, an analysis of the former being indispensable to the right comprehension of the latter ; it suggests means of lightening and shortening mental operations and thus offers a mode of improving educational methods ; and it promises in various directions to deepen and widen our knowledge of those processes by the complication and elaboration of which our mental life is so wonderfully built up."

The results of the observations referred to by Professor Jastrow are given in Tables of Simple Reaction Times and of Complex Reaction Times. One of the most important points considered is "the overlapping of mental processes," as to which Cattell made a special study. From the fact that the time needed for the performance of complete operations, as multiplying numbers and reciting a verse or two at the same time, is shorter than the sum of the times required to do each separately, it is inferred that the mind should be likened not "to a point at which but a single object can impinge at one time, but rather to a surface of variable extension." Moreover, "the performance of a complex and extended mental task is not the same thing as the separate performance of the several elements into which that task may be analysed." The addition of a classified Bibliography adds much to the value of Professor Jastrow's interesting little work. Ω.

ON SAMENESS AND IDENTITY. By *George Stuart Fullerton*. Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press.

Mr. Fullerton's psychological study is the first of a series of contributions to Philosophy to be issued by the University of Pennsylvania. It is truly entitled a "contribution to the foundations of a Theory of Knowledge," and is an attempt to arrive at an accurate conclusion as to the several senses in which the word *same* is used ; with an historical and critical statement of the use of the word in a wrong sense. Mr. Fullerton finds that *same* has seven different meanings according to the mode in which it is applied. In the first case it has the sense of *identity*, and in the second that of *similarity*. Thirdly, the "external" bundle of qualities may be regarded as being the same at two different times, while in a fourth sense, two "external" things, or "external" qualities, existing at one time, may be called the same to mark similarity. Again, an "external" thing or an "external" quality may be called the *same* with its external representative, as the identification of a thing with its reflection in a mirror. This is the fifth sense ; the sixth is where the

same "external" object is said to be perceived by different persons. Finally, an "external" thing may be said to be the same "with its representative in consciousness or with the substance or noumenon assumed to underlie it."

On searching for the reason why such various experiences are expressed by the use of one word, Mr. Fullerton discovers that the common notion which unites them is the idea of similarity. But how can we speak of similarity when strictly only one thing is in question? The answer given is that we have "a series of experiences, beginning with one in which two objects are recognised as similar and yet are very clearly distinguished as two objects, continued in others in which the sense of duality falls more and more into the background, and ending in one in which there is no consciousness of duality at all." The last of these experiences is not wholly different from the others. It differs from them "not in the element which has led us to declare two objects similar—the element which they have in common—but in that which has led us to declare them two and different. It is by adding to this last experience, so to speak, that we get the others. They contain it and more." The experience in which two things are not distinguished, is at the bottom of all our experiences of similarity. The use of the expression "X is X," then, emphasises the fact that one is not to pass from X to any Y or Z, and it, moreover, puts a period to one's thinking, and fixes the thought upon X alone. When the words "identity" and "sameness" are intended to be used with some degree of precision, the former word indicates "sameness in which there is no consciousness of duality, or in which the consciousness of duality has fallen into the background and may easily be overlooked."

More than half of Mr. Fullerton's work is occupied by an historical and critical consideration of the use of the word *same* in a wrong sense, beginning with Heracitus and coming down to Prof. W. K. Clifford. The examples he has given of that confusion of thought justifies the assertion of "the need of much greater care and exactitude than one commonly finds in metaphysical reasonings," and at the same time the hair-splitting for which Mr. Fullerton needlessly considers himself called on to plead guilty.

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INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION. WITH OTHER ESSAYS. By *Constance C. W. Naden*.

Edited by R. Lewins, M. D. London: Bickers & Son.

The chief of the essays comprised in this volume is an "historical and critical sketch of successive philosophical conceptions respecting the relations between inductive and deductive thought." It was awarded the Heslop Gold Medal as the best dissertation by a student of Mason College, Birmingham (England), in 1887, and Miss Naden was also rewarded for it by being made an Associate of the College, an honor she well deserved. The dissertation displays a wide knowledge of scientific facts with a rare capacity for dealing with them in a philosophical spirit, and a power of acute reasoning such as few other women have ever possessed. Whether her opinions are always correct is another question. It is a profound remark that